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Note
A Taking Timebomb: Loss of Access Takings as a
Barrier to Managed Retreat from Sea Level Rise
Isaac Foote*
In 2020, the looming challenge of climate migration broke
into the American public consciousness with the confluence of
record-breaking forest fires across the Western United States
and over thirty named tropical storms during the Atlantic
hurricane season.1 Over the course of the year, the National
Center for Environmental Information identified twenty-two
billion-dollar weather events in the United States: This was the
most billion-dollar events on record, and was three times greater
than the 1980–2019 average.2 However, the increasing intensity
and frequency of natural disasters is only one of the
consequences of unchecked climate change.3
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of Law, Science & Technology for editing & publishing this Note, Professor
Alexandra Klass for guiding me through the academic writing process,
Alexandria Dolezal & Chris Cerney for comments and suggestions from day one
to submission, and my partner, Delaney Cole, for originally drawing my
attention to SLR & her support throughout.
1. Cf. Abrahm Lustgarten, How Climate Migration Will Reshape America,
N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Sept. 15, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive
/2020/09/15/magazine/climate-crisis-migration-america.html (stating that 162
million Americans are likely to “experience a decline in the quality of their
environment” and 93 million are likely to have a “severe” reduction in quality);
Alex Domash, Americans Are Becoming Climate Migrants Before Our Eyes,
GUARDIAN (Oct. 2, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020
/oct/02/climate-change-migration-us-wildfires
(describing
internal
displacement in the United States due to forest fires); Kelsey Lahr, I Left
California Because of Climate Change, SLATE (Sept. 24, 2020), https://slate.com
/technology/2020/09/climate-change-migration-happening-now.html (providing
a personal account of climate migration).
2. U.S. Billion-Dollar Weather and Climate Disasters, NOAA NAT’L CTRS.
FOR ENVTL. INFO. (2020), https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/billions.
3. See U.S. GLOB. CHANGE RSCH. PROGRAM, CLIMATE SCIENCE SPECIAL
REPORT: FOURTH NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT, VOLUME I, 3–17 (Donald J.
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Climate change—as well as its associated rapid global
warming—is connected to a host of secondary and tertiary
effects that threaten people, property, and infrastructure across
the United States.4 While there has been significant discussion
and investment in fighting the causes of climate change, even
the most optimistic climate models predict disastrous
consequences.5 As a result, this Note will focus its attention on
adaptations that we will be forced to make in response to, and in
preparation for, the effects of climate change.6
Specifically, this Note will explore the issue of sea level rise
(SLR). SLR is already increasing the severity of hurricanes,7

Wuebbles et al. eds., 2017) (identifying acute and systemic threats of climate
change).
4. See id. (describing the trend of climate change both historically and as
projected into the future).
5. Compare id. at 7 (explaining that a rapid reduction in carbon emissions
would still result in a 2.6-degree Fahrenheit increase in global temperatures
compared to a 1900 baseline, and if carbon emissions continue to grow at the
current rate, then the growth in global temperatures could reach 8.5 degrees
above the 1900 baseline), with Chelsea Harvey, Worst- and Best-Case Scenarios
for Warming Less Likely Groundbreaking Study Finds, SCI. AM. (July 23, 2020),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/worst-and-best-case-scenarios-forwarming-less-likely-groundbreaking-study-finds/ (“There’s a 66% chance that
the sensitivity range falls between 2.6 and 3.9 C of warming (4.9 to 7 F).”);
Christiana Figueres & Tom Rivett-Carnac, “Air is Cleaner than Before the
Industrial Revolution”: A Best Case Scenario for the Climate in 2050, GUARDIAN
(Feb. 15, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2020/feb/15/bestcase-scenario-2050-climate-crisis-future-we-choose-christiana-figueres-tomrivett-carnac (describing a best-case-scenario response to climate change that
limits 2100 warming to 2.7 degrees Farhenheit).
6. Compare U.S. GLOB. CHANGE RSCH. PROGRAM, IMPACTS, RISKS, AND
ADAPTATION IN THE UNITED STATES: FOURTH NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT,
VOLUME II, 1348–49, (David R. Reidmiller et al. eds., 2018) [hereinafter
VOLUME II] (describing the necessary steps needed to reduce climate risks
through “emissions mitigation”), with id. at 1310–12 (describing the necessary
steps needed to reduce climate risks through “adaptation actions”).
7. Cf. Harvey Leifer, Sea Level Rise Added $2 Billion to Sandy’s Toll in
New York City, EOS (Mar. 16, 2015), https://eos.org/articles/sea-level-riseadded-2-billion-to-sandys-toll-in-new-york-city (“The storm surge affected
11.4% more people and 11.6% more housing units than it would have without
sea level rise.”).
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threatening coastal property,8 and damaging infrastructure.9 In
the face of this threat, we can “harden” sections of our coast
against rising waters,10 but we must also learn when to walk
away from coastal infrastructure that is now more expensive to
maintain than the utility it provides.11 The process of making
these decisions is what scholars refer to as a “managed retreat”
from climate change: The conscious recognition that we must
physically move away from places made inhospitable by the
changing climate.12
American identity, however, was not built on this
understanding.13 Encoded into our history are the ideas of
expansion and taming nature.14 The application of loss of access
8. Cf. Laurel Wamsley, Is the Risk of Sea Level Rise Affecting Florida
Home Prices? A New Study Says Yes, NPR (Oct. 15, 2020) (“[U]ntil 2012, sales
volume of homes in census tracts that were less exposed to sea level rise and
homes in tracts more exposed to it were trending similarly . . . . [B]ut from 2013
on, the volume of homes sold in Florida’s coastal areas with more sea level rise
exposure has fallen as sales in the state’s lower-risk coastal tracts have risen.”).
9. See VOLUME II, supra note 6, at 482 (identifying bridges, roadways,
railways, airports, ports, tunnels, and public transit as impacted by SLR and
coastal flooding).
10. See id. at 494 (describing “three case studies of resilience measures for
highway facilities”).
11. This requirement is described by the “sunk costs fallacy.” FRANCESCO
PARISI, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW AND ECONOMICS: A DICTIONARY 290 (2013).
Sunk costs are “non-recoverable costs incurred in the past” and “[A]ccording to
economic theory, sunk costs are irrelevant for future choices.” Id. The sunk cost
fallacy is factoring those previously incurred costs into present decisions, and
thus making a less optimal choice in the present simply “because of an aversion
to loss.” Id.
12. See Miyuki Hino et al., Managed Retreat as a Response to Natural
Hazard Risk, 7 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 364, 364–66 (“‘Retreat’ is used to
capture the philosophy of moving away from the coast rather than fortifying in
place. ‘Managed retreat,’ on the other hand, derives from coastal engineering
and has been defined as ‘the application of coastal zone management and
mitigation tools designed to move existing and planned development out of the
path of eroding coastlines and coastal hazards.’”).
13. Christopher Flavelle, U.S. Flood Strategy Shifts to ‘Unavoidable’
Relocation of Entire Neighborhoods, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2020), https://www
.nytimes.com/2020/08/26/climate/flooding-relocation-managed-retreat.html
(explaining that even the word “retreat,” with its connotations of defeat, sits
uncomfortably with American ideals of self-reliance and expansion. “‘Managed
retreat’ is giving up. That’s un-American,” said Karen O’Neill, an associate
professor of sociology at Rutgers University, in explaining why the concept
seemed unthinkable until recently).
14. See, e.g., NAT’L ACAD. SCI., ENG’G & MED., ECONOMIC AND
DEVELOPMENT IMPLICATIONS OF TRANSPORTATION DISINVESTMENT 7 (2015)
(describing the period between 1956 and 1992 as governed by an “expansion
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takings to infrastructure threatened by SLR is the embodiment
of this ethos. Loss of access takings is a judicially created
doctrine that awards inverse condemnation damages under the
Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution (or similar state
constitutional provisions) to individuals whose property is cut off
from public road systems by changes to roads abutting their
property. The doctrine was developed as a judicial check on
discretionary decisions made by government planners but has
already been applied to situations of managed retreat from
SLR.15
This Note will be the first comprehensive review of the loss
of access takings doctrine in the context of SLR and managed
retreat. It will argue that applying loss of access takings liability
to managed retreat decisions (1) is inconsistent with the
purposes of the Fifth Amendment, (2) is inverse to the historical
use of loss of access takings, and (3) risks skewing local
government investment decisions in favor of protecting the most
valuable property and not for the benefit of communities as a
whole.16 Finally, this Note will propose ways that judges can
modify loss of access takings liability in cases of managed retreat
from SLR to better meet the needs of a world restructured by
climate change.

paradigm” under which transportation infrastructure rapidly expanded and
future demand was simply assumed).
15. Jordan v. St. Johns Cty., 63 So. 3d 835 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)
(holding that local governments have a duty to maintain roads that access
private property, even in the context of SLR).
16. Compare id., with Thomas Ruppert, Castles—and Roads—in the Sand:
Do All Roads Lead to a “Taking”?, 48 ENV’T L. INST. 10914, 10914 (2018)
(arguing the doctrine of loss of access takings, as interpreted by the court in
Jordan, is inconsistent with “the new reality of SLR”), and Shana Jones et al.,
Roads to Nowhere in Four States: State and Local Governments in the Atlantic
Southeast Facing Sea-Level Rise, 44 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 67, 102–14 (2019)
(arguing that SLR illustrates the failings of the loss of access takings doctrine
as an ideal of unchangeable property rights clashes with very real and drastic
coastal transformation), and J. Peter Byrne, The Cathedral Engulfed: Sea-Level
Rise, Property Rights, and Time, 73 LA. L. REV. 69, 103–04 (2012) (arguing strict
construction of the loss of access doctrine “could severely hamstring reasonable
government planning for retreat, even in the absence of regulation of private
property uses”).
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I. BACKGROUND
A. DISRUPTING THE COASTAL STATUS QUO: SEA LEVEL RISE AND
MANAGED RETREAT
To the human eye, sea level rise can be difficult to spot. After
all, it would be nearly impossible for a single person to notice an
annual average global increase of less than one inch.17 However,
the “symptoms” of SLR are already impacting coastal
communities; sunny day flooding, beach erosion, and inadequacy
of flood protection infrastructure decrease day-to-day coastal
quality of life at best and leave homes destroyed at worst.18 This
section will first describe the drivers of SLR and its implications
for coastal communities in the United States. From there, this
section will unpack the concept of “managed retreat” from SLR
and how infrastructure disinvestment can facilitate the process.
1. The Expanding Threat of Sea Level Rise
Using tidal gauge measurements, we know that global sea
levels have risen significantly since the beginning of the
twentieth century.19 The introduction of satellite technology in
the early 1990s not only confirmed the tidal gauge readings, but
indicated SLR was accelerating: Between 1993 and 2018, mean
sea level rose in 23 of the 25 years, and by 2018, mean sea level
sat 8.1 centimeters above the 1993 average.20 Projections

17. See Alan Buis, Can’t “See” Sea Level Rise? You’re Looking in the Wrong
Place, NASA: ASK NASA CLIMATE (May 13, 2020), https://climate.nasa
.gov/blog/2974/cant-see-sea-level-rise-youre-looking-in-the-wrong-place (“The
case of Ocean Isle Beach illustrates a key paradox about sea level rise: since it
occurs relatively slowly, it can be easy to think it’s not happening. But as
oceanographer and climate scientist Josh Willis of NASA’s Jet Propulsion
Laboratory in Pasadena, California, told me, if you’re not seeing it, you’re just
not looking in the right place.”).
18. Id.
19. Climate Change Indicators: Sea Level, EPA (Aug. 2016),
https://www.epa.gov/climate-indicators/climate-change-indicators-sea-level#:~
:text=When%20averaged%20over%20all%20of,as%20the%20long%2Dterm
%20trend.
20. AM. METEOROLOGICAL SOC’Y., STATE OF THE CLIMATE IN 2018, 84–87
(Jessica Bluden & Derek S. Arndt eds., 2019) [hereinafter STATE OF THE
CLIMATE IN 2018].
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estimate that by 2100, mean sea level will sit between 0.2 and
2.0 meters above current levels.21
The physical causes for SLR are directly tied to increasing
global temperatures. Primarily, higher global temperatures melt
ice stored in glaciers and fill ocean basins with additional water
mass.22 Secondarily, higher global temperatures increase the
surface temperature of ocean waters and slightly expand the
water.23 This results in decreasing oceanic density and, as a
result, higher waters along the coasts.24 Roughly two-thirds of
the increase in mean sea level between 1993 and 2018 was the
result of increased oceanic mass and the remaining one-third
resulted from decreased oceanic density.25 Both causes of SLR
will be magnified by future global temperature growth and may
reach some of the worst-case scenarios if global temperatures
climb high enough to destabilize the Greenland and Antarctic ice
sheets. 26
While “mean sea level” provides a single-number
representation of the state of SLR globally, ocean currents and
local geography can magnify the challenge for some
communities. 27 Internationally, small island nations already
view SLR as an existential threat. 28 Within the United States,
there will be marked regional variation:29 Some sub-regions (like
the Florida Keys) are already being impacted by SLR, 30 while
21. WILLIAM V. SWEET ET AL., NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN.,
GLOBAL AND REGIONAL SEA LEVEL RISE SCENARIOS FOR THE UNITED STATES
11–12 (2017) (providing an intermediate range between 0.5 and 1.2 meters).
22. Id. at 43–44.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See STATE OF THE CLIMATE IN 2018, supra note 20, at 150–56
(describing changes in the Greenland Ice Sheet).
27. See SWEET ET AL., supra note 21, at 9–10 (describing the concept of
“relative sea levels”).
28. See Pacific Small Islands and ‘Big Ocean Nations’ at UN Assembly
Make the Case for Climate Action, Shift to Clean Energy, UN NEWS (Sept. 25,
2020), https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/09/1073852 (describing statements by
the leaders of Micronesia, Tuvalu, Kiribati, Papua New Guinea, and Tonga in
which they call for aggressive international action against climate change to
combat SLR and protect fisheries).
29. SWEET ET AL., supra note 21, at 24–27.
30. See Christopher Flavelle & Patricia Mazzei, Florida Keys Deliver a
Hard Message: As Seas Rise, Some Places Can’t Be Saved, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/04/climate/florida-keys-climatechange.html (describing the need to elevate 300 miles of Key West roads).
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other larger areas (like the Northeastern Coast and Western
Gulf) are at an elevated risk of SLR-related injuries due to a
combination of ocean currents, subsidence, and natural
elevation.31
2. A “Managed Retreat” from Rising Seas
In the face of SLR, communities have three options for
adaptation: “protect (build infrastructure to protect
development), accommodate (build with the water, such as
elevating houses), or retreat (move people away from the
shore).”32 In some places—such as large, coastal population
centers—protecting infrastructure makes both economic and
practical sense.33 In others, where hardening options are readily
and cheaply available, accommodating can maximize the value
of coastal property with minimal disruption.34 But for many
coastal areas, the costs of the former two options will be
prohibitive and/or the level of difficulty in implementation will
be extremely high.35 The managed retreat framework provides a
response to SLR that allows for the efficient use of scarce
protection resources. Without a managed retreat from SLR,
uncoordinated property owners run the risk of either
overinvesting in unsustainable property or underinvesting in
property that can still be serviced by sufficient infrastructure. 36
31. SWEET ET AL., supra note 21, at vi–vii (“Along regions of the Northeast
Atlantic . . . and the western Gulf . . . [regional sea level] is projected to be
greater than the global average for almost all future [global mean sea level] rise
scenarios . . . .”).
32. Carolyn Kousky, Managing Shoreline Retreat: A US Perspective, 124
CLIMATIC CHANGE 9, 9 (2014).
33. See Brad Plumer, Should We Try to Fight Rising Sea Levels — Or
Retreat From the Coasts?, VOX (May 22, 2014, 11:30AM EDT), https://www
.vox.com/2014/5/22/5735144/rising-sea-levels-abandoning-the-coasts.
34. Kousky, supra note 32, at 9.
35. See Gary Yohe et al., The Economic Damage Inducted by Sea Level Rise
in the United States, in THE IMPACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON THE UNITED
STATES ECONOMY 178, 197, 203–06 (1999) (studying thirty coastal communities
and finding that one-third would likely need to be abandoned due to SLR).
36. See Kousky, supra note 32 at 9–10. The author identified four reasons
the “market is unlikely to lead to optimal levels or types of retreat in all
locations.” Id. at 9. First, unilateral investment in protection may harm
adjacent property and public goods like beach access. Id. at 9–10. Second,
protection may prevent the migration of coastal ecosystems inland, thus
‘squeezing’ them out of existence between the ocean and human occupied land.
Id. at 10. Third, coastal development is heavily subsidized, so protection
investments are not fully borne by landowners. Id. Fourth, without third-party
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This section will unpack the managed retreat framework with,
first, a discussion of projected human movement away from the
coasts and, second, how managed retreat and infrastructure
disinvestment will interact with this migration.
Regardless of regional variation, SLR will impact all coasts
of the United States and, with 40% of Americans living in coastal
counties, the impact will be systemic.37 Whether initiated by the
residents of affected land or by third parties (such as government
entities or insurance companies), SLR will quickly make some
communities unsustainable in the face of rising seas. 38 Today,
1.7 million Americans live below their regional higher-high
water line,39 and models predict that by 2100, 13.1 million
Americans will be displaced due to the physical inundation of
their land with a 1.8-meter rise in mean sea level.40 It is difficult
to predict how the combination of SLR-induced physical
displacement and decreased quality of life (through secondary
effects of SLR like increased severity of weather and frequency
of coastal flooding) will impact wider patterns of migration.41
Nevertheless, migration models estimate an additional twentyfive million Americans will move to inland counties due to
“indirect effects” of SLR.42 The inland city of Austin, Texas, for
example, is already projecting over “800 thousand incoming
migrants due to SLR.”43

coordination, some areas will receive over-investment while others are lost due
to delays. Id.
37. VOLUME II, supra note 6, at 323–26.
38. See Hino et al., supra note 12, at 365 (describing a conceptual model for
resident versus non-resident initiated managed retreat); see, e.g., Flavelle,
supra note 13 (describing the federal government buyouts of communities, like
Isle de Jean Charles, Louisiana, that are threatened by SLR); FED. EMERGENCY
MGMT. AGENCY, HAZARD MITIGATION ASSISTANCE MITIGATION ACTION
PORTFOLIO 26 (2020) (describing $500 million in federal funding for “mitigation
projects” by local, state, and tribal governments that may include relocation of
communities).
39. Scott A. Kulp & Benjamin H. Strauss, New Elevation Data Triple
Estimates of Global Vulnerability to Sea-Level Rise and Coastal Flooding, 10
NATURE COMM., no. 4844, 2019, at 9.
40. Caleb Robinson et al., Modeling Migration Patterns in the USA Under
Sea Level Rise, 15 PLOS ONE, no.1, 2020, at 2.
41. See id. at 3 (explaining that most existing studies of SLR have simply
declined to include indirect effects of SLR in their projections).
42. Id. at 11.
43. Id. at 12.
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Whatever the mechanisms that push people inland, one of
the key drivers of their relocation will be the availability of
infrastructure to provide services for their coastal property.44
“Asset relocation”—the movement of infrastructure to more
protected ground while maintaining services to coastal areas—
can be understood as a modified version of hardening coastal
infrastructure.45 “Infrastructure disinvestment,” by contrast,
“refers to a process of consciously allowing an infrastructure
asset to ‘fall below previously accepted standards of condition or
performance,’ typically to be able to reduce long-term investment
in the asset and prioritize resources elsewhere.”46 Both are part
of the managed retreat framework, but due to the fundamental
shift in approach encompassed by infrastructure disinvestment,
this Note will focus on the latter in its analysis. 47
Functionally, infrastructure disinvestment may be
accomplished “passive[ly]” or “intentionally.” 48 Passive
disinvestment occurs through a single or series of policy choices
that downgrade infrastructure maintenance until the
unsustainable infrastructure degrades to the point of unusability.49 This is typical for infrastructure disinvestment in
the United States, as it is driven by budget and state capacity
limitations rather than a studied analysis of the sustainability
of infrastructure in the face of a changing environment. 50 This is
44. See Kim S. Alexander et al., Managed Retreat of Coastal Communities:
Understanding Responses to Projected Sea Level Rise, 55 J. ENV’T PLAN. &
MGMT. 409, 410–12 (2012) (“Coastal urban planning departments are acutely
aware that they are responsible for the replacement of urban infrastructure and
are now also required to factor climate change projections and SLR-related risks
into planning decisions.”).
45. See Managed Retreat Toolkit, Asset Relocation and Realignment, GEO.
CLIMATE
CTR.,
https://www.georgetownclimate.org/adaptation/toolkits
/managed-retreat-toolkit/asset-relocation-and-realignment.html (last visited
Dec. 5, 2020) (“Relocating or realigning roads, or high-risk segments of roads,
to less vulnerable locations may offer a longer-term solution than design
modifications or protective measures.”).
46. Managed Retreat Toolkit, Infrastructure Disinvestment, GEO. CLIMATE
CTR., https://www.georgetownclimate.org/adaptation/toolkits/managed-retreattoolkit/phased-out-maintenance-and-abandonment.html (last visited Dec. 5,
2020) [hereinafter Infrastructure Disinvestment] (quoting NAT’ L ACAD. SCI.,
ENG’G & MED., supra note 14, at 9).
47. Kousky, supra note 32, at 14–15.
48. NAT’L ACAD. SCI., ENG’G & MED., supra note 14, at 1.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 11 (describing fiscal constraints, like continued reliance on gas
taxes despite reductions in gas purchased, on road maintenance budgets).
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unfortunate because passive disinvestment can lead to a
reduction in safety and an increase in liability over the short
term and limit economic and social impact mitigation over the
long term.51
Intentional disinvestment is more consistent with the goals
of managed retreat,52 as intentional disinvestment decisions
manage “natural hazard risk” rather than budget limitations. 53
At first blush, passive and intentional strategies may look quite
similar as both reduce investment with the goal of retiring the
infrastructure.54 However, the two strategies employ
significantly different methods of accomplishing the end goal.
First, in intentional disinvestment, there is an explicit
movement of infrastructure to a lower level of maintenance and,
consequently, some notice to the public of this shift. 55 In the case
of roads, this both alerts landholders to the shift in the status of
the road impacting their property, and alerts drivers they are
entering a less safe area of roadway.56 Second, in the case of
intentional disinvestment in response to SLR, there is an
acknowledgement that the process will end in abandonment of
the infrastructure.57 This protects landholders as there are
specific legal requirements that accompany abandonment58 and
federal programs that may assist in providing compensation for
affected landholders. 59 Further, by acknowledging this end
point, government entities can modify their future plans with

51. Infrastructure Disinvestment, supra note 46; see also Jones et al., supra
note 16, at 82–85 (summarizing the negligence standard for duty to repair and
maintain roads in Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, and North Carolina).
52. Infrastructure Disinvestment, supra note 46.
53. See Hino et al., supra note 12, at 365 (defining the goals of managed
retreat).
54. NAT’L ACAD. SCI., ENG’G & MED., supra note 14, at 9.
55. See Infrastructure Disinvestment, supra note 46 (describing the
importance of community engagement in making and executing infrastructure
disinvestment decisions).
56. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 160.095 (West) (providing the designation
and signage requirements for a “minimum maintenance road” in Minnesota).
57. Infrastructure Disinvestment, supra note 46.
58. Jones et al., supra note 16, at 102 (summarizing the abandonment
authority and standard of review for different government entities in four
southeastern states).
59. See, e.g., FED . EMERGENCY MGMT . AGENCY, supra note 38, at 29–30
(describing the federal-state-tribal collaborative relocation of Newtok Village,
Alaska in the face of “[p]rogressive shoreline erosion along the Ninglick River”).
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the recognition that, at some point, the affected infrastructure
will be overtaken by the sea.60
Today, there are 60,000 miles of roads and bridges in coastal
floodplains in the United States.61 Even the most conservative
SLR projections indicate this infrastructure will become
increasingly expensive to maintain in the face of rising waters.62
Planners in Key West, Florida found:
[T]o keep . . . three miles of road dry year-round in 2025 would require
raising it by 1.3 feet, at a cost of $75 million, or $25 million per mile.
Keeping the road dry in 2045 would mean elevating it 2.2 feet, at a
cost of $128 million. To protect against expected flooding levels in
2060, the cost would jump to $181 million.63

This led the mayor of Monroe Country (where the section of
road was located) to simply conclude “we can’t protect every
single house,” even with the understanding that “we’ll probably
face some lawsuits” from residents.64 SLR places policy makers
in a fiscal bind: They can continue the patchwork effort of
hardening some roads and passively disinvesting from others
with no systemic plan for SLR, or they can begin the process of
intentional disinvestment and risk liability with respect to
impacted landholders today.65
B. LOSS OF ACCESS TAKINGS AND LEGAL CHALLENGES TO
MANAGED RETREAT
If a government entity embarks on a program of passive or
intentional disinvestment for a section of road, landholders have
multiple legal theories under which they may challenge the
decision. If the entity decides to use a strategy of passive
disinvestment, then landholders may bring a loss of access

60. See NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., ENG’G & MED., supra note 14, at 6 (describing
the need to assess “wider transportation impacts” from infrastructure
disinvestment).
61. VOLUME II, supra note 6, at 323–26.
62. Id. at 324.
63. Flavelle & Mazzei, supra note 30.
64. Id.
65. E.g., PAUL WILDES ET AL., MARINE EXTENSION & GA. SEA GRANT,
LEGAL ISSUES WHEN MANAGING PUBLIC ROADS AFFECTED BY SEA LEVEL RISE:
GEORGIA (2019) (explaining the processes and legal risks of abandoning a road
due to SLR in Georgia).
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takings claim66 or tort action.67 If an entity decides to employ
intentional disinvestment culminating in abandonment, then
landholders may, again, bring a loss of access takings claim 68 or
they may challenge the administrative process behind the
decision.69 Due to the variable and statutory nature of tort and
administrative theories, this Note will set them aside. Instead,
this Note will address the history and applicability of loss of
access takings claims due to SLR-motivated disinvestment.

66. See Jones et al., supra note 16, at 111–12 (describing how the loss of
access doctrine was expanded to include a duty to maintain roadways).
67. Id. at 69, 81–82. The exact level of duty to maintain roads varies among
states, counties, and cities, and is usually set by statute. See id. at 85. Examples
of statutory maintenance requirements include a duty to: keep roads in
“reasonably safe condition,” “improve, manage, and maintain” the road system,
maintain the road system in “a safe and serviceable condition,” and “keep roads
in proper repair and open for travel and free from unnecessary obstructions.”
Id. For a complete breakdown of state, county, and municipal duties within four
southeastern states, see id. It is also important to note that these claims may
be prevented by various forms of sovereign immunity granted to government
entities and that damages will likely not be the full value of the plaintiffs’
property, as would be the case under a takings claim. See id. at 92–101.
68. See Byrne, supra note 16, at 103 (“[G]overnment’s failure to maintain
public access can effectuate a taking of the marooned property.”).
69. Similar to the duty analysis, the exact abandonment authority of
government entities is usually set by statute and varies based on state and level
of entity. See Jones et al., supra note 16, at 102. Examples of abandonment
authority at the county level include: “[a] county may vacate, abandon,
discontinue, or close a road but may not act to harm the public welfare,” “[a]
county may abandon a road if the county board of commissioners determines
that the road no longer serves a substantial public purpose or abandoning the
road is in the best public interest,” and “[a] county governing body may
discontinue a public road found to be useless and if it is in the best interest of
all parties.” Id. For a complete breakdown of state, county, and municipal duties
within four southeastern states, see id.
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1. What Defines a Loss of Access Taking?
The theory of loss of access takings is simultaneously longstanding,70 widely adopted,71 and poorly defined.72 Under the
Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution,73 a plaintiff
may bring a claim for inverse condemnation if they hold a
“constitutionally protected interest” and that interest was taken
for “public use.”74 Generally, takings claims are defined as either
regulatory takings, which “deprive the owner of all beneficial use
of his property,” or physical takings, where some form of
70. Compare Callender v. Marsh, 18 Mass. 418 (Mass. 1823) (rejecting a
diminution of access takings claim on the historical theory that only physical
takings are compensable), with Town Council of Akron v. McComb 18 Ohio 249
(Ohio 1849) (accepting a diminution of access takings claim using regulatory
takings language).
71. 46 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3d 493 § 13 (1998); see also Travis Martay
Brennan, Redefining the American Coastline: Can the Government Withdraw
Basic Services From the Coast and Avoid Takings Claims?, 14 OCEAN &
COASTAL L.J. 101, 130 n.147 (2008) (listing state supreme court cases in which
loss of access takings claims were granted).
72. See Byrne, supra note 16, at 103 (explaining that loss of access takings
is a “vague and under-theorized body of law”); Ashely Mas, Note, Eminent
Domain Law and “Just” Compensation for Diminution of Access, 36 CARDOZO
L. REV. 369, 371 (2015) (“[A] property right to reasonable access is now
uniformly accepted, however, the scope of that right remains poorly defined.”);
William B. Stoebuck, The Property Right of Access Versus the Power of Eminent
Domain, 47 TEX. L. REV. 733, 735–36 (1969) (“As the encroachment upon this
type of right becomes more remote or less complete, however, it becomes
difficult to predict the exact point to which a given court will continue to protect
it.”); M. Gordon Brown, Evading Economic Reality: Real Property Access
Takings and the Slippery Slope of Legal Language, 50 INT’L J.L. & MGMT. 285,
286 (2008) (“[T]he myriad legal disputes about property access takings that
reach appeals courts in almost every state court system of the USA indicate
there is no clear agreement nor understanding of what constitutes ‘reasonable’
access.”).
73. U.S. CONST. amend. V. This Note will use the language of the Fifth
Amendment as a general guide for discussing the constitutional basis for loss of
access claims. However, the Supreme Court has not specifically acknowledged
loss of access takings liability. In fact, it rejected the theory in three 1800s cases.
See, e.g., Smith v. Corp. of Wash., 61 U.S. (20 How.) 135 (1857); Transportation
Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635 (1878); Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269 (1897).
The Court has not revisited the loss of access issue, which is not entirely
surprising given the primary responsibility for the actual building and
maintenance of roads occurs at the state and local level. Alison J. Midden,
Property – Taking of Access: Minnesota Supreme Court Declines to Allow
Admission of Evidence of Diminished Access Due to Installation of a Median in
a Takings Case, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 329, 336 (1999).
74. Matthew Holt, Orange Barrel Litigation: Revisiting Temporary Loss of
Access Claims Caused by Construction Projects, 50 REAL PROP., TRUST &
ESTATE L.J. 309, 311 (2015).
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property is actually appropriated by the government. 75 Judges
at the state level have extended similar provisions of state
constitutions76 to create the loss of access taking: If a
landowner’s access to the public street network is not just
“inconvenienced” but “substantially” limited, then they may
bring a claim requesting “just compensation” for their impacted
land.77 While the definition of “substantially” is inconsistent
between jurisdictions,78 a complete termination of one’s access to
their property constitutes a “perfect example of denial of access
without a trespassory act,” or, in other words, a loss of access
taking.79 To eliminate ambiguities in this framework, this Note
75. Mas, supra note 72, at 370; see also Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505
U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992) (“[W]hen the owner of real property has been called upon
to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good,
that is, to leave his property economically idle, he has suffered a taking.”). But
see Brennan, supra note 71, at 129 (defining “substantial interferences with
landowners’ relationship to their property” as a category of taking distinct from
the physical and regulatory categories and containing loss of access takings).
76. More than half of the state constitutions contain a takings clause that
is materially different from the federal one, in that it prohibits property from
being both “taken” and “damaged” or “injured” for public use without just
compensation. Maureen E. Brady, The Damagings Clauses, 104 VA. L. REV. 341
(2018). It is unclear, however, the extent to which this difference has impacted
loss of access takings liability in different states. In Bacich v. Bd. of Control of
California (which will be referenced again below) the California Supreme Court
stated that “the addition to the eminent domain clause in constitutions in most
states, including California, of ‘or damaged’ to the word ‘taken’ indicates an
intent to extend that policy to embrace additional situations.” 144 P.2d 818, 823
(Cal. 1943). However, in Florida (where Jordan clearly indicates loss of access
takings exist), the Florida Constitution only states that “[n]o private property
shall be taken except for a public purpose and with full compensation therefor
paid to each owner or secured by deposit in the registry of the court and
available to the owner.” FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 1. A full exploration of the impact
of state constitution variation will require additional scholarship beyond the
scope of this Note.
77. Stoebuck, supra note 72, at 735; see also Adamson v. People, 332 U.S.
46 (1947) (applying federal takings protections to state governments as well).
But see Brown, supra note 72, at 286 (demonstrating loss of access takings have
been incorporated into non-judicial records through means such as the
annotations to Section 15 of the Colorado Bill of Rights).
78. See Mas, supra note 72, at 381–85 (noting standards of “substantial”
include “unreasonably deficient” and “unsuitable for the property’s highest and
best use”); HEIDI WESTERFIELD ET AL., CTR. FOR TRANSP. RES., A MODEL FOR
ESTIMATING THE VALUE OF PROPERTY ACCESS RIGHTS 7 (1995) (“[I]t is
obvious . . . that the definition of reasonable access is a purely subjective one.
Inconsistencies in the analysis of reasonable access litigation indicate that no
uniformity exists, and the individual judge may determine what he/she believes
to be ‘reasonable.’”).
79. Stoebuck, supra note 72, at 738.
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will assume any instance of infrastructure disinvestment will
ultimately culminate in a complete termination of public road
access to affected property.
Despite the strong duty that the loss of access doctrine
creates in the absolute case, courts have consistently limited the
implementation of loss of access claims. First, they refuse to
grant compensation for circuity of access or diversion of traffic.80
Second, they only grant causes of action to landowners whose
property immediately abuts the affected street. 81 Third, with the
introduction of freeways in the post-WWII era, courts refused to
grant recovery when landholders’ access to highways were
replaced by frontage roads.82 Finally, there is no duty for a
government to purchase a road easement and build a road to an
individual’s property, so by implication, the duty only begins
once the road is built.83
2. Are Loss of Access Takings Physical or Regulatory Takings?
At first glance, the loss of access takings doctrine does not
fit neatly into either the physical or regulatory takings
category;84 there is no restriction of the use of the property in
question, as would be normally seen in a regulatory taking, and
there is no legislatively-recognized form of property actually
trespassed upon by the government, so there is no clear physical
taking.85 Courts have filled this gap with two alternative
theories defining the relationship between property and a road

80. Mas, supra note 72, at 380; Mark S. Dennison, Landowner’s Right to
Compensation for Loss of Access Caused by Highway Improvement, 46 AM. JUR.
PROOF FACTS 493 § 17 (3rd ed. 1998).
81. Dennison, supra note 80, § 15.
82. Id. § 21.
83. See generally From Plan to Pavement: How a Road is Built, MICH. DEP’T
TRANSP., https://www.michigan.gov/mdot/0,4616,7-151-9615-129011—,00.html
(last visited Jan. 28, 2022) (“A road project begins with evaluating the
transportation system, taking into account statewide priorities, including the
department’s mission and vision, and its strategic plans for the state’s
transportation system.”).
84. See Holt, supra note 74, at 313 (“The law is somewhat fanatical about
putting things into categories . . . . [L]oss-of-access claims do not fit neatly into
either category because the claims do not involve the government physically
taking or invading property, nor do the claims involve any regulation in the
classic sense of the word.”).
85. Id.
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that abuts it. 86 The first approach treats the continued access to
roads as a basic property right or a “noneconomic interest in
land.”87 The second approach recognizes a legally-protected
easement between the land and access to the road. 88 This
easement generally covers both the ability to access the public
road from the property (i.e. maintain a driveway) and the right
for that street to connect to the public network of streets. 89 While
treating these as rights that the government can appropriate
would seem to invoke a physical-takings approach, most courts
treat the issue as a regulatory taking.90 This reflects the
economic reality of many loss of access takings cases: Property
without access to the public road system has its economic
potential severely (if not entirely) limited.91
Whatever the theory a state legal system uses to allow
recovery for a loss of access takings claim, the origins of the claim
are ambiguous at best. 92 As early as 1943, the Supreme Court of
California stated:
86. David M. Jann, Unraveling the Property Right of Access to Roadways,
FAEGRE DRINKER (Apr. 1, 2016) https://www.faegredrinker.com/en/insights
/publications/2016/4/unraveling-the-property-right-of-access-to-roadways
(noting that both approaches generally reach similar conclusions).
87. See Stoebuck, supra note 72, at 734 (referring to these as “jurally
enforced rights and privileges”); see, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003, 1078 n.8 (1992) (“Though our prior takings cases evince an abiding
concern for the productive use of, and economic investment in, land, there are
plainly a number of noneconomic interests in land whose impairment will invite
exceedingly close scrutiny under the Takings Clause.”).
88. See, e.g., City of Waco v. Texland Corp., 446 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tex. 1969)
(“[A]n abutting property owner possesses an easement of access which is a
property right; that this easement is not limited to a right of access to the
system of public roads; and that diminishment in the value of property resulting
from a loss of access constitutes damage.”).
89. Stoebuck, supra note 72, at 734.
90. Holt, supra note 74, at 314.
91. Some scholars argue for the use of a third category of takings: “[C]ases
where the government (or a third party acting pursuant to explicit
governmental authority) uses its own property in ways that interfere with the
ability of other owners to use and enjoy their properties.” Carlos A. Ball, The
Curious Intersection of Nuisance and Takings Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 819, 820
(2006). Holt argues that this can be applied to temporary loss of access takings
but does not address permanent loss of access cases. Holt, supra note 74, at
314–19.
92. Evidence of successful loss of access takings claims date back to at least
1842, where the Kentucky Court of Appeals recognized “[e]very owner of ground
on any street in Lexington, has a right, as inviolable as it is indisputable, to the
common and unobstructed use of the contiguous highway, so far as it may be
necessary for affording him certain incidental easements and services, and a
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It has long been recognized in this state and elsewhere that an owner
of property abutting upon a public street has a property right in the
nature of an easement in the street which is appurtenant to his
abutting property . . . . The precise origin of that property right is
somewhat obscure but it may be said generally to have arisen by court
decisions declaring that such right existed and recognizing it. 93

In his foundational 1969 article on loss of access takings,
William B. Stoebuck recognized this line of reasoning as a
“truism, for no form of property exists in legal contemplation
except it be recognized by a court.”94 Upon further exploration,
Stoebuck himself was unable to find any definitive answer on
how loss of access takings made their way into the law,
summarizing:
Various answers have been speculated upon, such as that the state
intended roads to serve abutting land, that abutters provided the
roads through payment of assessments or even contribution of labor
and materials, and that early compensation cases usually involved
street railways that were outside the original road purpose. Such
speculation, while fun, is not too profitable, for the reasons offered are
probably only rationalizations for a more intuitive, more visceral
judicial motivation. It simply would be unfair. 95

This fundamental issue of fairness remains the underlying
justification for loss of access takings today.96 Loss of access
takings serve to protect individual landholders from
discretionary decisions by government planners. If a planner
decides to move or remove some section of road for the public

convenient outlet to other streets.” Transylvania Univ. v. Lexington, 3 B. Mon.
25 (Ky. 1842). Many early loss of access takings cases were associated with
changes of street grade, which were common in the eighteenth century to allow
for the installation of sewers and other sub-surface infrastructure. See
McCombs v. Town Couns. Akron, 1849 WL 105 (Ohio 1849); see also Stoebuck,
supra note 72, at 757–60; see generally Sideprojects, The Raising of Chicago:
Manually Lifting The Windy City in the 19th Century, YOUTUBE (Nov. 17, 2020),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QWQa2jCNzIc.
93. Bacich v. Bd. Control Cal., 23 Cal. 2d 343, 349–50 (Cal. 1943)
(referencing sources relying on California and other state constitutions).
94. Stoebuck, supra note 72, at 763.
95. Id. Despite this assertion that the legal rationale for loss of access
takings is essentially a tautology, the Stoebuck article is cited as evidence of
loss of access takings liability by, at minimum, the highest courts of
Connecticut. Luf v. Southbury, 449 A.2d 1001, 1005 (Conn. 1982); Fla. Dep’t
Transp. v. Stubbs, 285 So. 2d 1, 2 (Fla. 1973); Goldstein v. Baltimore, 327 A.2d
770, 774 (Md. 1974); City of Waco v. Texland Corp., 446 S.W.2d 1, 2 n.1 (Tex.
1969); Wernberg v. Alaska, 516 P.2d 1191, 1200 n.46 (Alaska 1973); Keiffer v.
King Cnty., 89 Wash. 2d 369 (Wash. 1977)).
96. See, e.g., Mas, supra note 72, at 373 (“The just compensation guarantee
rests on principles of equity and fairness.”).
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benefit and this discretionary decision burdens one landowner,
then the loss of access takings doctrine remedies this harm.97
This trend of fairness is consistent with judicial interpretations
of the Fifth Amendment: In Armstrong v. United States the
Supreme Court established the Armstrong Principle, namely
that “[t]he Fifth Amendment’s guarantee that private property
shall not be taken for a public use without just compensation
was designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone
to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should
be borne by the public as a whole.”98 This principle continues to
influence takings decisions to date and is routinely cited by the
United States Supreme Court, state Supreme Courts, and
constitutional scholars. 99 The relationship between loss of access
takings and the Armstrong Principle will be explored at greater
length in the Analysis Section of this Note.
3. Do Loss of Access Takings Imply an Affirmative
Constitutional Obligation on Government?
The loss of access takings doctrine implies that once a road
is constructed, the government has an absolute duty to continue
the existence of the road or risk an inverse condemnation
claim.100 This is unexpected, as “[t]he Constitution is typically
thought to create only negative rights—rights that constrain the
government from acting in certain proscribed ways.”101 For
example, the First Amendment limits the Government’s ability

97. See Brown, supra note 72, at 285–86
98. 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960); Stephen Durden, Unprincipled Principles: The
Takings Clause Exemplar, 3 ALA. CIV. RTS. & CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 25, 41–46
(2013) (describing how this phrase developed into the “Armstrong Principle”
which still informs takings decisions today). Again, the United States Supreme
Court has not recognized loss of access takings and loss of access takings are a
creature of state constitutional law. However, most state constitutions share at
least similar language to the U.S. Constitution on issues of eminent domain;
The Armstrong principle holds “a remarkable degree of assent across the
spectrum of opinion.” William Michael Treanor, The Armstrong Principle, the
Narratives of Takings, and Compensation Statutes, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1151, 1153 (1997).
99. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency,
535 U.S. 302, 321 (2002); Durden, supra note 98, at 44–46.
100. See, e.g., Jordan v. St. Johns Cty., 63 So. 3d 835, 838 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2011) (“We hold that the County has a duty to reasonably maintain Old A1A as
long as it is a public road dedicated to the public use.”).
101. Christopher Serkin, Passive Takings: The State’s Affirmative Duty to
Protect Property, 113 MICH. L. REV. 345, 346 (2014).
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to interfere with speech, the Second Amendment limits the
Government’s ability to interfere with gun ownership, and the
Third Amendment limits the Government’s ability to quarter
soldiers in a person’s home.102 In the context of the Fifth
Amendment, this is contrary to the traditional legal analysis for
both physical takings (which center an actual trespass onto the
property of the landowner)103 and regulatory takings (which
center limitations on the use of the property in question).104 This
contradiction is highlighted by two recent cases that address
affirmative duties of government entities and the Fifth
Amendment, as discussed below.
In Jordan v. St. Johns County, approximately thirty
landholders brought an inverse condemnation claim against St.
Johns County, Florida for failure to maintain the “Old A1A”—a
road across “low-lying, narrow spit of sand between the Summer
Haven River and the Atlantic Ocean” in northeastern Florida.105
On summary judgment, the Florida Court of Appeals found the
residents’ argument “that the County has so failed in its duty to
reasonably maintain and repair Old A1A that it has effectively
abandoned it, thereby depriving them of access to their property
without compensation” was a “cognizable claim.”106 This holding
was despite the fact that (1) the County had already paid an
average of $244,305 annually to maintain the road between 2000
and 2005, which included a $2.8 million dredging project funded
by the state, (2) the County projected the road needed a one-time
$13 million investment to continue its useful life, (3) the County
projected recurring investments of “$5.7-$8.5 million every three
to five years thereafter” to continue maintenance of the road,
and (4) the annual budget of St. John County, which maintains
1,026 miles of roads for 200,000 residents, was only $9.6 million
at the time.107 With this ruling and a finding that there were still
102. U.S. CONST. amends. I–III.
103. Mas, supra note 72, at 370.
104. Id.
105. Ruppert, supra note 16, at 10915–16 (citing Jordan v. St. Johns County,
No. 05-694, slip op. at 5 (Fla. Cir. Ct. May 21, 2009)).
106. Jordan, 63 So. 3d at 839.
107. Ruppert, supra note 16, at 10916–19 (citing Jordan v. St. Johns County,
No. 05-694, slip op. at 5 (Fla. Cir. Ct. May 21, 2009)) (noting the district court
found in favor of the County on summary judgement). But see Jordan, 63 So. 3d
at 835 (the Florida Court of Appeals did not mention the County’s previous
financial commitments nor their financial projections for maintaining the road
in the opinion).
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disputed facts in the record, the Florida Court of Appeals denied
the County’s motion for summary judgement.108 However, before
a trial could be held on remand, the County and landholders
settled out of court.109
In St. Bernard Parish Gov’t v. United States, St. Bernard
Parish, Louisiana and a collection of landowners brought an
inverse condemnation claim against the United States
Government for failure to maintain a levee. 110 During Hurricane
Katrina, one of the levee walls of the Mississippi River-Gulf
Outlet (MRGO) channel collapsed and flooded St. Bernard
Parish outside of New Orleans’ Lower Ninth Ward. 111 The
MRGO channel was constructed in the 1950s by the United
States Army Corps of Engineers and the plaintiffs alleged that
“over the course of the next several decades, the construction,
operation, and improper maintenance of the MRGO channel
caused various adverse impacts that increased storm surge
along the channel.”112 In 2015, the U.S. Court of Federal Claims,
where takings claims against the federal government are filed,
found that flooding caused by the collapse of the levee was a
temporary taking.113 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, however, overruled the lower court’s decision
and found that the Army Corps was immune from liability
because takings claims are only available for “affirmative acts
by the government.”114 The court rejected the confluence of tort
108. Jordan, 63 So. 3d at 835.
109. Ruppert, supra note 16, at 10915.
110. 121 Fed. Cl. 687, 690–91 (Fed. Cl. 2015).
111. Determining Climate Responsibility: Government Liability for
Hurricane Katrina?, 49 ENV’T L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10005, 10005–06
(2019) [hereinafter Determining Climate Responsibility].
112. St. Bernard Par. Gov’t v. United States, 887 F.3d 1354, 1357–58 (Fed.
Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 796, 202 (2019) (describing plaintiffs’
arguments as alleging “[t]he construction, operation, and failure to maintain
MRGO increased salinity in the water by providing a direct route for salt water
to flow into the area from the Gulf of Mexico. The saltwater changed the
character of the marshes and destroyed wetlands in the area that previously
acted as a natural buffer against flooding. Moreover, the ‘failure of the Army
Corps to maintain the banks’ caused erosion along the banks, which allowed
more water to pass through the channel at higher velocities. MRGO also created
the potential for a funnel effect, which increased flooding during storms by
compressing storm surge into the channel and causing it to rise faster and
higher”).
113. St. Bernard Par. Gov’t, 121 Fed. Cl. at 746.
114. St. Bernard Par. Gov’t, 887 F.3d at 1360; accord Ark. Game & Fish
Comm’n v. United States, 568 U.S. 23, 38–39 (2012) (assigning takings liability
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and takings law implied by the Florida Court of Appeals in
Jordan, stating “[t]he government’s liability for a taking does
not turn, as it would in tort, on its level of care.”115
II. ANALYSIS
Despite the inconsistent application and legally enigmatic
justification for loss of access takings liability, this Note will not
argue against their general application. Loss of access to the
public road system can cause significant harm to landowners to
the point that some scholars actually recommend broadening the
definition of what “substantial” loss of access includes.116
However, in the narrow context of the managed retreat from
climate change, this Note proposes that the loss of access takings
doctrine is the wrong tool to address a no-win situation. The
following analysis will first describe why the legal justification
for loss of access takings is incompatible with managed retreat
from SLR, then will propose alternative rationales that judges

for the affirmative government action of flooding private property, despite the
fact that the action was made necessary by heavy rain).
115. St. Bernard Par. Gov’t, 887 F.3d at 1360–61 (quoting Moden v. United
States, 404 F.3d 1335, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). This distinction between tort and
taking has been of substantial interest to courts and scholars in the aftermath
of the United States Supreme Court case Arkansas Game & Fish Commission
v. United States, which found a temporary flooding could constitute a taking.
568 U.S. 23 (2012); see Sandra B. Zellmer, Takings, Torts, and Background
Principles, 52 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 193, 193–94 (2017) (discussing how, postArkansas Game & Fish Commission, landowners impacted by flooding “have
been emboldened to pursue inverse condemnation actions,” while at the same
time, this could produce a “chilling effect” as officials may be “less likely to
restrict improvident floodplain and coastal development” over a fear of taking
claims).
116. Accord Mas, supra note 72, at 396 (“A flagrant deficiency of judicial
justifications for use of the substantial impairment standard in loss of access
cases supports the proposition that adhering to the bright-line market-valuebased assessment of damages used in total and partial physical takings cases
would more justly and uniformly compensate landowners and prevent the cost
of public projects from falling on the shoulders of an unlucky few.”); Holt, supra
note 74, at 335–36 (“Under the current law, the expenses [of temporary loss of
access] will be allocated to the property owners who are immediately affected
by the project. Since the losses are a cost associated with the project, however,
the losses should be paid by the public, and the business owner compensated
for those losses.”); Midden, supra note 73, at 350 (“Although Minnesota’s
Constitution intends to justly compensate those whose land is taken by the
state, here, the Minnesota Supreme Court is not allowing full compensation in
refusing to admit evidence of loss of access to determine diminution in market
value of the properties.”).
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can utilize in analyzing loss of access takings cases resulting
from managed retreat from SLR.
A. BAD LAW: THE LEGAL CASE AGAINST LOSS OF ACCESS
TAKINGS LIABILITY FOR SLR INDUCED MANAGED RETREAT
The dual cases of Jordan and St. Bernard Parish
demonstrate the challenging decisions that courts will be
increasingly forced to engage with as climate change threatens
the world we previously assumed we could control.117 Climate
change will disrupt the legal system in a myriad of ways as
historical paradigms are broken down and new ways of thinking
are required.118 The inapplicability of loss of access takings to
managed retreat will be one adaptation the legal system should
embrace.
1. Loss of Access Takings for SLR-Induced Managed Retreat
Are Inconsistent with the Armstrong Principle.
Distilling takings law into a single, coherent theory can feel
like a hopeless task: The sheer variety of permutations of ways
in which government can infringe on property makes any one
theory often maddeningly incomplete.119 However, scholars and
the United States Supreme Court agree that the Armstrong
Principle provides a unifying theme across all Fifth Amendment

117. See Rupert, supra note 16, at 10930–32 (discussing the holdings in
Jordan and St. Bernard Parish).
118. See generally J.B. Ruhl, General Design Principles for Resilience and
Adaptive Capacity in Legal Systems – With Applications to Climate Change
Adaptation, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1373, 1374–75 (2011) (“Climate change soon will
begin to disrupt the settled expectations of humans . . . . Demands on the legal
system will be intense and long term, but is the law up to the task?”).
119. See John E. Fee, The Takings Clause as a Comparative Right, 76 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1003, 1006 (2003) (“If there is a consensus today about regulatory
takings law, it is that it is highly muddled.”); Raymond R. Coletta, Reciprocity
of Advantage and Regulatory Takings: Toward a New Theory of Takings
Jurisprudence, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 297, 299–300 (1990) (“[Takings jurisprudence]
has been a jurisdictional chameleon of ad hoc decisions that has bred
considerable confusion . . . .”); Holt, supra note 74, at 311 (“[Takings] [c]ases are
confusing and confused, and there is precious little doctrinal clarity.”); Andrea
L. Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles, Part I—A
Critique of Current Takings Clause Doctrine, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1299, 1303–04
(1989) (“[T]he Court’s takings doctrine is in far worse shape than has generally
been recognized—indeed . . . it is difficult to imagine a body of case law in
greater doctrinal and conceptual disarray.”).
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takings.120 As a result, for loss of access takings claim to be
justifiable in a given situation, the situation must meet the
requirements established in Armstrong: namely, (1) the property
was taken for public use, (2) the property was originally taken
without just compensation, (3) the property owner alone bears a
public burden, and (4) “in all fairness and justice” that burden is
one that “should be borne by the public as a whole.”121
Under both judicial constructions of loss of access takings
claims (as a government appropriation of a property right or of
an appropriation of an easement) loss of access takings resulting
from managed retreat from SLR meet the first element of the
Armstrong Principle. While it is possible to debate whether
granting such significant property rights should be a legislative
rather than judicial decision,122 given the longstanding and
intuitive nature of loss of access takings in the general case, this
Note will not challenge this aspect of the loss of access theory.123

120. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535
U.S. 302, 332 (2002) (citing Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960))
(articulating for the first time the “Armstrong principle” that there is an
“interest in protecting property owners from bearing public burdens which, in
all fairness and justness, should be borne by the public as a whole”); Durden,
supra note 98, at 42 (quoting Carlos A. Ball & Laurie Reynolds, Exactions and
Burden Distribution in Takings Law, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1513, 1534
nn.103–04 (2006)) (“[T]he Armstrong principle, has been endorsed in almost
every important takings opinion of the last thirty years, both by Justices who
contended that the regulations before the Court amounted to takings, as well
as by those who disagreed.”).
121. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
122. Ruppert, supra note 16, at 10920 (“The need to spend at least $13
million on beach nourishment before even beginning to recreate a road that
serves a small handful of homes so that the road is ‘maintained’ in existence
cannot be compared to the cost to, say, fill potholes or sweep sand off the road
or to mill and resurface an existing road as part of periodic ‘maintenance.’ The
appellate court confused these definitions and used the word in a way that led
the appellate court to invade the local government’s legislative duty and
authority to make the challenging decisions that balance important interests
such as property rights, fiscal responsibility, and public rights.”).
123. It should be noted that in Andrus v. Allard a unanimous Court found
that “[t]he denial of one traditional property right does not always amount to a
taking. At least where an owner possesses a full ‘bundle’ of property rights, the
destruction of one ‘strand’ of the bundle is not a taking, because the aggregate
must be viewed in its entirety.” 444 U.S. 51, 65–66 (1979). This finding may
have a broader implication for loss of access takings, as even without public
road access, landowners still possess the remaining bundle of rights associated
with land ownership. While one can imagine landowners losing complete legal
access to their property through the abandonment of a road, the property may
retain some value as access can be maintained through other means of access
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This Note will also assume that the second element of the
Armstrong Principle is met. While SLR may eventually threaten
affected property owners and the determination of “just
compensation” questioned for such threatened property, this
discussion is beyond the scope of this Note and will require a
broader reevaluation of property valuation than required.124
Elements three and four of the Armstrong Principle apply
far less readily to SLR induced loss of access takings claims. For
a road to qualify for intentional disinvestment, instead of some
form of protection or accommodation, the value of the road to the
broader community must be, by definition, limited. 125 After all,
part of the managed retreat framework is the prioritization of
scarce resources to protect essential infrastructure while letting
ancillary aspects deteriorate with limited investment. 126 As a
result, a loss of access claim by a landowner cut off from the road
system due to the abandonment of a road will center on the
interests of that landowner as opposed to the broader
community.
In Jordan, for example, the County repeatedly emphasized
that investing in the Old A1A would be at the expense of needed
maintenance in other areas of the public road system. 127 This
opportunity cost argument contrasts with the justification for
loss of access takings in contexts outside of SLR. 128 In his
exploration of the interaction between property rights and SLR,
Peter Byrne argues that, “this judicially-created doctrine [of loss
like boat (for coastal property) or through the acquisition of an access easement
from a private or public party. See also John W. Sheridan, The Legal Landscape
of America’s Landlocked Property, 37 UCLA J. ENV’T L. & POL’Y 229, 236–52
(2019) (considering legal solutions to the western checkerboard problem).
124. See United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 373 (1943) (defining just
compensation as “the full and perfect equivalent in money of the property
taken”); Byrne, supra note 16, at 118 (explaining some of the challenges with
determining just compensation in the context of SLR).
125. See Managed Retreat Toolkit: Infrastructure, GEO. CLIMATE CTR.,
https://www.georgetownclimate.org/adaptation/toolkits/managed-retreattoolkit/infrastructure.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2020) (describing
considerations government entities must make in applying managed retreat to
infrastructure).
126. Id.
127. See supra Section I.B.3 (describing the costs incurred by St. Johns
County and the state of Florida to maintain The Old A1A).
128. See id. (discussing how protecting the landowner from bearing a public
burden is a paramount concern in loss of access takings); see PARISI, supra note
11, at 208 (defining “opportunity cost” as “the value of the second best
(unchosen) alternative”).
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of access takings] may have made sense in light of an owner’s
normal reliance on public access for his or her land and concerns
about government discrimination, but such rationale is greatly
diminished in the shadow of sea-level rise.”129 The County in
Jordan was not making a discretionary or discriminatory
judgement; instead, its hand was being forced by nature.130
In Jordan, the Florida Court of Appeals performed a
mechanical application of the loss of access takings doctrine and
found that if the traditional elements for a loss of access taking
were met, then this would create a right to compensation.131 This
is unsurprising given that loss of access takings are well
established in Florida law;132 however, the decision entirely
ignored the needs of the community in favor of the needs of a
select group of coastal property owners.133 Going forward,
“[j]udge-made doctrines to protect property owners under
normal conditions should not be extended to provide inflexible
protections under changed environmental conditions.”134
2. Loss of Access Takings for SLR Induced Managed Retreat
Challenge the Distinctions Between Tort and Takings Law
While neither Jordan nor St. Bernard Parish analyze
intentional disinvestment and only Jordan applies to loss of
access takings, their contrary conclusions are instructive of the
legal uncertainty around applying takings liability to a world
impacted by climate change.135 With challenges like worsening
severe weather and SLR, maintaining the status quo may be
perceived as an affirmative or non-affirmative act. Either way,
129. Byrne, supra note 16, at 104.
130. See Ruppert, supra note 16, at 10918–20 (describing required actions
the County would have needed to take to maintain the road in Jordan).
131. Jordan v. St. Johns Cty., 63 So. 3d 835 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
132. See Palm Beach Cty. v. Tessler, 538 So. 2d 846, 849 (Fla. 1989) (stating
the elements of the loss of access takings in Florida, describing cases supporting
the loss of access doctrine, and, somewhat ironically, citing directly to Stoebuck).
133. Id. at 849–50.
134. Byrne, supra note 16, at 104.
135. See Jones et al., supra note 16, at 112–14 (“[T]his trend of transforming
negligence claims into takings claims is likely to ‘produce a chilling effect,
making officials less likely to restrict improvident floodplain and coastal
development for fear of takings claims.’” (quoting Sandra B. Zellmer, Takings,
Torts, and Background Principles, 52 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 193, 194 (2017)));
see also Serkin, supra note 101, at 389–98 (discussing potential takings liability
skewing government decision making related to hardening coastal
infrastructure).
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“[s]ea-level rise illuminates ‘some of the absurdities of much of
the regulatory takings doctrine,’ as an ideal of unchangeable
property rights clashes with very real and drastic coastal
transformation.”136 This section will unpack the challenge of
applying the “affirmative act” framework, as defined by both the
Jordan and St. Bernard Parish courts, to infrastructure
disinvestment in response to SLR.
The Federal Circuit in St. Bernard Parish defined an
affirmative act as one that corresponds to an “authorized
activity.”137 In doing so, the court was attempting to make a clear
distinction between tort and takings liability.138 Namely, for
unauthorized activities plaintiffs could turn to tort law and for
authorized activities plaintiffs could use the Fifth
Amendment.139 This reasoning appears to directly reject the
decision in Jordan, where the Florida Court of Appeals
connected the County’s tortious failure to maintain the Old A1A
to the plaintiffs’ loss of access claims.140 As a result, the St.
Bernard Parish decision represents an improvement over the
Jordan approach, namely, it reconnects the loss of access takings
doctrine to the discretionary decisions it is meant to protect
landowners against.141 Further, it allows exogenous forces, like
SLR, to play a role in the narrative while the Jordan court
created an absolute duty to maintain the Old A1A in the face of
seemingly insurmountable costs.142
While the St. Bernard Parish decision solves some of the
deficiencies of Jordan, it does not fully address the challenges of
applying loss of access takings to SLR. Thomas Ruppert argues
136. Jones et al., supra note 16, at 113.
137. St. Bernard Par. Gov’t v. U.S., 887 F.3d 1354, 1360–61 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
(“In both physical takings and regulatory takings, government liability has
uniformly been based on affirmative acts by the government or its agent.”).
138. Id.
139. See Ruppert, supra note 16, at 10931–32.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id at 10931 (“The appellate court in St. Bernard Parish emphasized
that ‘the [takings] causation analysis requires the plaintiff to establish what
damage would have occurred without government action.’ Thus, in that case,
rather than ask, as the lower court did, whether MRGO had made flooding
worse, the legal standard applied should have been a ‘comparison [of] the flood
damage that actually occurred to the flood damage that would have occurred if
there had been no government action at all.’ Stated alternatively, ‘Causation
requires a showing of what would have occurred if the government had not
acted.’”).
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that St. Bernard Parish will allow local governments to begin
the process of long-term managed retreat planning.143 In making
this claim, however, Ruppert assumes that courts will not view
intentional disinvestment as an affirmative act. 144 This position
is unsupported by St. Bernard Parish as at no point did the Army
Corps of Engineers explicitly move the levee to a lower standard
of maintenance.145 Instead, the plaintiffs’ claims failed because
they “could not show that the flooding would not have occurred
in the absence of . . . the MRGO . . . [and thus, they] could not
establish a taking.”146 If planners utilize a strategy of intentional
disinvestment, plaintiffs may flip this reasoning on its head and
argue that without the decision to disinvest from a roadway,
some minimal level of maintenance could have kept it
operational. 147 After all, even though St. Bernard Parish
modifies the maintenance demands on government entities, it is
not a loss of access case so it does not address the independent
rights created by a road abutting a landowner’s property.
B. BAD ECONOMICS: HOW LOSS OF ACCESS TAKINGS MAY
CREATE MISALIGNED GOVERNMENT INCENTIVES
The cost of infrastructure required to respond to SLR is
astronomical:

143. Id. at 10932 (“Local governments should consider efforts to evaluate the
long-term prognoses of increased infrastructure maintenance costs versus
future revenue streams; based on such analysis, local governments should begin
to pass policies and disseminate information that helps to appropriately shape
the long-term expectations of property owners about which infrastructure in
which areas will likely be able to be maintained.”).
144. See supra Section I.A.2 (discussing the negative aspects of passive
disinvestment).
145. Ruppert argues that in Czech v. City of Blaine (a case cited by the
Florida Court of Appeals to justify takings liability for inaction) the denial of a
permit is a sufficiently affirmative act to invoke takings liability; this would
imply that a long-term managed retreat plan would also be an affirmative act.
Ruppert, supra note 16, at 10922 (citing Czech v. City of Blaine, 253 N.W.2d
272, 275 (Minn. 1977)).
146. Determining Climate Responsibility, supra note 111, at 10009.
147. Of course, none of this would remove tort liability for statutory duties
to maintain, but Jones et al. found that duties to maintain in four Southeastern
states alternatively did not provide damages comparable to the just
compensation required by loss of access claims or were protected by sovereign
immunity. Jones et al., supra note 16, at 82–98; see also Kirkpatrick v. Town of
Nags Head, 713 S.E.2d 151 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011) (declining to compensate a
landowner’s tort claim alleging the town’s failure to repair a road repeatedly
damaged by storms violated their duty to maintain).
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In Boston . . . an estimated $2.4 billion will be needed over the next
several decades to protect the city from flooding . . . [i]n Charleston,
South Carolina, the mayor . . . estimated $2 billion in needed
drainage projects . . . [i]n Norfolk, Virginia, the Army Corps of
Engineers has recommended a $1.4 billion series of seawalls . . . [and
i]n Harris County, home to Houston, planners say $30 billion is
needed to provide protection against a 100-year flood.148

Prioritizing these massive investments is already a
significant challenge for policymakers and the challenges will
only grow as the challenge of SLR magnifies.149
Unfortunately, scholars are already identifying a divergence
between how high-income and low-income areas are treated by
government entities responding to SLR.150 In a North Carolina
study, researchers found “[s]horeline armoring is more common
in areas that have low racial diversity and higher home values,
household incomes, and population densities. Adaptation
measures based around property acquisitions, such as home
buyout programs, correlate with high racial diversity and low
home values, household incomes, and population densities.”151
This trend can destroy communities and displace families
already struggling economically while increasing actual
investment in groups already the most financially secure.152
The current construction of loss of access takings will only
magnify this problem. If policymakers are forced to pay the full
value of property affected by an infrastructure disinvestment
148. Jim Morrison, Who Will Pay for the Huge Costs of Holding Back Rising
Seas, YALE ENV’T 360 (Aug. 5, 2019), https://e360.yale.edu/features/who-willpay-for-the-huge-costs-of-holding-back-rising-seas.
149. Id. (“[B]y 2040, building sea walls for storm surge protection for U.S.
coastal cities with more than 25,000 residents will require at least $42 billion.
Expand that to include communities under 25,000 people and the cost
skyrockets to $400 billion.”).
150. See Michael Allen, Protection for the Rich, Retreat for the Poor, HAKAI
MAG. (Oct. 14, 2020), https://www.hakaimagazine.com/news/protection-for-therich-retreat-for-the-poor/; Jones et al., supra note 16, at 121 (“Many
transportation decisions, unfortunately, have had a history of
disproportionately benefiting white and high-income people over low-income
people of color.”); see also A.R. Siders, Social Justice Implications of US
Managed Retreat Buyout Programs, 152 CLIMATIC CHANGE 239, 239 (“[Buyout]
decisions often involve political motivations and rely on cost-benefit logic that
may promote disproportionate retreat in low-income or minority communities,
continuing historic patterns of social inequity.”).
151. Allen, supra note 150 (citing A.R. Siders & Jesse M. Keenan, Variables
Shaping Coastal Adaptation Decisions to Armor, Nourish, and Retreat in North
Carolina, 183 OCEAN & COASTAL MGMT. 105023 (2020)).
152. Allen, supra note 150.
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decision, then their decisions on what roads to protect will be
motivated by reducing liability instead of community or
efficiency goals. An extremely simplified hypothetical
demonstrates this risk: In a seaside county there are two streets
threatened by SLR and the local government has only $3 million
to address the situation. On Bay Street, there are two $1 million
mansions and on Gulf Street there are five $200,000 homes. The
cost to protect Bay Street is $2 million and the cost to protect
Gulf Street is only $1.25 million. Assuming that without
intervention both streets will be destroyed, the county can
calculate the total cost of repairing either street. If the county
only repairs Bay Street, then the cost will be $3 million ($2
million for the repairs and $1 million for the Gulf Street loss of
access claims). If the county only repairs Gulf Street, then the
cost will be, $3.25 million dollars ($1.25 million for repairs and
$2 million for the Bay Street loss of access claims). A rational
government planner will choose to repair Bay Street, because
even though the repairs are far more expensive and protect
fewer people, it will limit the county’s liability and maintain its
budget.
This problem is magnified by the governmental bodies that
will be held liable for loss of access claims. Local governments
are responsible for the maintenance of the large majority of
roads in the United States. 153 “Local decision-makers are facing
hard questions about whether to build new infrastructure, adapt
existing infrastructure to new standards, continue maintaining
existing infrastructure as is, or abandon infrastructure
altogether.”154 They are dealing with limited budgets and
addressing SLR affected roads risks depleting “the resources
necessary to keep the remainder of the road network in safe and
navigable condition.”155 It is well-established law that the role of
governments is not to act as the absolute insurer of property
values, however, the broad application of loss of access takings
risks making them local guarantors of coastal property.156
153. See Maxine Burkett, Duty and Breach in an Era of Uncertainty: Local
Government Liability for Failure to Adapt to Climate Change, 20 GEO . MASON
L. REV. 775, 777 (“Local governments wield significant influence on the
development patterns and the resilience of the infrastructure within the coastal
zone.”); Jones et al., supra note 16, at 68–69.
154. Jones et al., supra note 16, at 69.
155. Id. at 114.
156. See Ruppert, supra note 16, at 10923 (citing Deshaney v. Winnebago
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195–96 (1989)).
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C. JUDICIAL SOLUTIONS TO LOSS OF ACCESS PROBLEMS
The dual realities of rising seas and finite government
resources will almost inevitably create future conflicts between
government planners and landowners over whether to harden or
abandon roads.157 Yet, for the vast majority of jurisdictions,
courts have yet to make a determination on the applicability of
traditional loss of access takings to situations of managed
retreat from SLR. 158 Unfortunately, this means many
jurisdictions will continue to operate in uncertainty until more
cases are litigated and decisions published on the issue.159
Fortunately, however, this also means future judges are not
bound to a mechanical application of loss of access takings
liability in cases of managed retreat from SLR.
This Section presents three paths forward for judges to
choose from that integrate the historic goals and justifications of
the loss of access takings doctrine into the economic and
scientific realities of the managed retreat framework. First,
judges may choose to defer to local government processes for
abandonment decisions, on the basis that it is inherently a policy
rather than a legal judgement. Second, judges may choose to
distinguish between discretionary and non-discretionary
abandonment decisions to allow for international disinvestment.
Third, judges may redefine what “substantial access” means in
the face of SLR and update the doctrine to a world changed by
climate change.
1. Option One: Deferring to Government Processes
Traditional loss of access takings, consistent with physical
and regulatory takings, serve to protect landowners from
interference by government overreach.160 Loss of access takings
for managed retreat from SLR, however, create an affirmative
duty on government to expend resources to continue the
existence of a road.161 This shift risks making courts responsible
157. E.g., Brennan, supra note 71, at 131 (arguing that in 2008 loss of access
litigation could prevent managed retreat from SLR, several years before the
Jordan case).
158. The author has been unable to identify another loss of access takings
connected to SLR beyond Jordan.
159. See supra Section I.A.2 (describing uncertainty around liability for
SLR-related threats to roads in the Florida Keys).
160. Supra Section I.B.2 (describing different forms of takings).
161. Id.
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for the resource allocations of local governments, which is
contrary both to principles of separation of powers and the
traditional position of courts on government allocations
decisions. Courts generally grant “deference to governments to
make policy decisions concerning the allocation of government
resources”162 and attempt not to overrule “the allocation of local
governmental
resources
among
various
authorized
programmatic objectives.”163
As a result, this option proposes judges treat claims related
to loss of access due to managed retreat from SLR as allocations
decisions rather than takings claims. This (1) is more consistent
with the actual action taken by government in a managed
retreat situation, (2) maintains traditional distinctions between
the roles of courts and other branches of government, and (3)
ensures that any judicial review looks at the process of a
managed retreat decision instead of the result of that managed
retreat decision. As mentioned above, most states have
formalized abandonment procedures for roads.164 By reviewing
these statutorily defined procedures, a court can ensure the
interests of affected landowners are represented. However,
instead of a review centered on the interests of the individual
landowner, the review can holistically consider the interests of
the community in which the road resides.165
2. Option Two: Refocusing on Discretion of Planners
Much of this Note has emphasized the difference between
passive and intentional disinvestment within the managed

162. Brennan, supra note 71, at 132.
163. JOHN MARTINEZ, Discretion and Purpose in Providing Services; Scope
Note, in 3 LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW §18:1 (Thomson Reuters 2021); see also
Harold H. Bruff, Judicial Review in Local Government Law: A Reappraisal, 60
MINN. L. REV. 669, 702 (1972) (“If the power involved is of a kind traditionally
subject to greater judicial deference, such as is true of much economic regulation
and the regulation of matters involving technical expertise, the courts should
exercise greater restraint. And where local governments exercise novel powers
for which they may need some initial latitude, the courts can cooperate.”).
164. See WILDES ET AL., supra note 65 (explaining road abandonment
procedures in Georgia).
165. Id. at 13 (“ When deciding whether abandonment is proper, courts and
public boards consider a variety of factors, including the financial burden of the
maintaining the road, the public’s dependence on the road, and what caused a
decrease in the public’s use of the road.”); Jones, et al., supra note 16, at 135
(“[A]n adaptive duty to maintain that applies across all jurisdictions, affirms a
holistic approach to road maintenance . . . .”).
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retreat framework.166 In fact, one can argue that passive
disinvestment is only roughly, if at all, consistent with the goals
of a managed retreat from SLR; after all, the line between
passive disinvestment in threatened infrastructure and
systemic underinvestment in essential roads is murky at best.167
As a result, government planners should be encouraged to utilize
intentional disinvestment strategies in the face of passive
alternatives. Whether this means periodic vulnerability
assessments for potentially SLR affected roads,168 designating
some infrastructure as in “environmentally challenging
locations,”169 or simply educating landowners about the threat of
SLR to roads they rely on,170 proactive policy makers can ensure
several positive policy outcomes before a final abandonment
decision is needed. Some of these positive impacts include (1)
allowing market forces to act on landowners prior to final
abandonment of roads,171 (2) maximizing the infrastructure that
can be effectively protected,172 and (3) informing zoning and
approval decisions for new construction.173

166. See supra Section I.A.2 (describing the role of passive and intentional
disinvestment in the managed retreat framework).
167. Id.
168. Jones et al., supra note 16, at 121–23 (“Vulnerability assessments can
be used to characterize the projected impacts of climate change or sea-level rise
on a government in regard to the vulnerability of infrastructure or capital assets
such as roads. For example, the assessment can show where roads and
stormwater features serving roads need retrofits by identifying road segments
expected to have future flood risks due to elevation or geographic location.”).
169. Ruppert, supra note 16, at 10928 (noting that in the Jordan case, while
St. Johns County’s attempt to place exactly such a classification on the Old A1A
was not deferred to by the court of appeals in their determination, this still
provides a means in which the threat of SLR can be formalized).
170. Id. at 10927 (“[Governments should] ensure that property owners and
potential property purchasers are clearly aware of the physical risks of
purchasing or building in low-lying or hazardous, dynamic areas such as along
beaches.”).
171. See generally Patrick Walsh et al., Adaptation, Sea Level Rise, and
Property Prices in the Chesapeake Bay Watershed, 95 LAND ECON. 19, 19–21
(finding that investment in SLR protection creates a “significant” increase in
property price, providing “suggestive evidence that the property market
appears to be incorporating both the threat of future SLR and mitigation
approaches”).
172. See Infrastructure Disinvestment, supra note 46.
173. See Ruppert, supra note 16, at 10916 (noting that St. Johns County
originally maintained an ordinance banning construction on the Old A1A but
allowed exceptions over time culminating in the roughly 30 landowners that
sued the County in Jordan).
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Given the broad benefits of intentional disinvestment
compared to passive disinvestment, this option proposes judges
create a safe harbor for local governments from loss of access
takings liability if the loss of access is (1) the result of a managed
retreat strategy and (2) is necessary to implementing that
strategy. This will encourage government officials to create a
managed retreat plan and make careful, evidence-based
determinations over what infrastructure can and cannot be
saved. Of course, the definition of necessity will require
specification over time, but this is entirely consistent with the
common law origins of the loss of access takings doctrine. It is
within the scope of the courts to use their judicial discretion to
advocate for positive policy outcomes when interpreting a
judicially created doctrine.
3. Option Three: Redefining Access for a Changing World
Throughout this Note, we have assumed that access must
be maintained through a road. This reflects the “primacy of the
automobile in American life” but is not necessarily consistent
with the regulatory takings and loss of access standards. 174 To
be a regulatory taking, the regulation must “eliminate all
economically beneficial use” of a given property.175 Does losing
vehicle access to property render it economically worthless? The
Jordan case itself demonstrates that this is not true: Several of
the property owners could still reach their homes, even after the
abandonment of the road, through a footpath referred to as the
“pig trail.”176 While loss of access to the public road system
almost certainly limited the value of the land in question, some
value remained. A similar analysis may be done for what
constitutes “substantial” loss of access to one’s property. For
many traditional loss of access takings decisions, substantial

174. Edward Humes, The Absurd Primacy of the Automobile in American
Life, ATLANTIC (Apr. 12, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive
/2016/04/absurd-primacy-of-the-car-in-american-life/476346/; see also Gregory
H. Shill, Should Law Subsidize Driving?, 95 N.Y.U. L. REV. 498, 500 (2020)
(“There’s little question that the car is now central to American life. But missing
from our collective understanding of this sticky truism is the role of the legal
system. America is car-centric—indeed car-dependent—by law.”).
175. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992)
176. Ruppert, supra note 16, at 10916. In fact, Florida law expands upon the
common law “way of necessity easement” to allow such easements even without
the traditional requirement that landlocked property and the property that now
cuts it off from public roads originate from a single estate. Id. at 10916 n.17.
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and legally-impossible can be interchangeably used.177 If this
narrow reading is used, loss of access takings claims may be
rejected if there is some other legal means of accessing the
property.
This option proposes judges incorporate both of these
concerns into a new interpretation of loss of access claims: A loss
of access takings claim may only be granted for the full value of
the property if (1) the plaintiff is able to demonstrate that,
without the public road, it is practically impossible to obtain
legal entry to the property or (2) without a road the property has
no economic use. These requirements may seem extreme in the
face of our traditional reliance on cars, but these concentrated
burdens may pale in comparison to the millions of dollars
required to maintain a road to serve those burdened.178 As with
option two, this option will require refinement of how its terms
are interpreted by courts, but again, loss of access takings are a
judicially created doctrine that has the flexibility to grow and
change with new circumstances. Adopting this option would
signal that it is not the burden of local governments to support
landowners threatened by SLR to an unlimited degree and will
shift at least some of the mitigating burden to the landowners
themselves.
III. CONCLUSION
Climate change will force the legal system to change
assumptions made for generations.179 Luckily, as a judicially
created doctrine, the interpretation of loss of access takings
claims can change with climate. Modifying judicial
interpretation of the loss of access takings doctrine in response
to SLR will allow local governments to adopt managed retreat
and infrastructure disinvestment strategies. This will ease the
impact of SLR on such communities and allow planners to make
decisions that maximize social impact rather than minimize
potential takings liability.

177. Stoebuck, supra note 72, at 736.
178. Supra Section I.B.3 (describing the costs associated with the Jordan
case).
179. See Ruhl, supra note 118, at 1373 (“As climate change begins to disrupt
the settled expectations of humans, demands on the legal system will be intense
and long term.”).

